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Abstract 
Audit committees are responsible for initial and subsequent appointment of the external auditor 
but are not required to disclose reasons for their choice of the auditor. Investors have raised 
concerns about the lack of audit committee transparency, particularly considering longer auditor 
tenure in U.S public companies. In recent years, some firms are voluntarily disclosing factors the 
audit committee considers when reappointing the external auditor. We investigate whether these 
disclosures are mere representations of favorable impressions or depict audit committees’ vigilant 
monitoring of the auditor. First, we find that the likelihood of disclosure increases with higher 
perceived impaired auditor independence, investor activism pressure on the board of directors, and 
audit committee quality. Next, we find that these disclosures negatively moderate the positive 
association between egregious financial restatements and audit committee member turnover. 
Finally, we find that the disclosures decrease the likelihood that the financial statements the auditor 
is reappointed to audit will be restated in future periods. Our results are robust to several additional 
analyses, including controlling for endogeneity using propensity-score matching and 
instrumentation. The evidence is relevant to various stakeholders including the SEC, investors and 
others interested in audit committee transparency. We provide evidence that although some firms 
voluntarily disclose auditor reappointment factors to create favorable impressions, overall, these 
disclosures are more indicative of audit committee substantive monitoring of the external auditor. 








Audit Committee Disclosure of Auditor Reappointment Factors:  
Vigilant Monitoring or Window Dressing 
 
“… I would say point of fact that the group of individuals who hold the most influence over the 
appointment decision and retention would be management.” 
 
1. Introduction 
 At many U.S. public companies, auditor tenure is very long. For example, the average 
auditor tenure was 66 years among the twenty-one Dow 30 companies that had released their 
annual reports by April 13, 2018 (Haimowitz 2018). Given stakeholders’ concerns that long audit 
tenure can decrease auditor effort or impair auditor independence, the continued reappointment of 
such auditors casts doubts about audit committees’ oversight of the audit process.  Moreover, as 
evidenced by the quote above and survey evidence, despite the audit committee’s contractual 
responsibility to appoint and terminate auditors, management continues to wield considerable 
influence over this process (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright 2010; Cohen et al 2012). Some 
companies are beginning to disclose the factors the audit committee considers in reappointing 
auditors. This study examines whether these disclosures represent presentations designed to create 
a favorable impression (i.e., window dressing) or audit committees’ substantive oversight (i.e., 
vigilant monitoring). 
 On the one hand, companies have incentives to ward off pressure from shareholders and 
prevent mandatory auditor regulation through these disclosures. Specifically, in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis of 2008 and the discussions leading to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 
shareholders questioned the rationale and the process for appointing the same auditor year-over-
year, including whether (and how) the board reviews the performance of the auditor. Shareholders’ 
main concern is that prolong incumbent auditor reappointment is a mere rubber-stamp. These 
discussions, among other things, led to a PCAOB proposal on mandatory auditor rotation (which 
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has since been abandoned). In the absence of mandatory rotation, some firms are voluntarily 
disclosing factors they consider when deciding to appoint (or not to appoint) the incumbent auditor.  
On the other one hand, audit committees’ voluntary disclosure of their considerations in 
deciding to retain the incumbent auditor potentially provides a window into the audit committee’s 
gatekeeping role and insights about the processes in place to protect auditor independence and 
professional skepticism. Regulators and investor groups support these voluntary disclosures, 
calling them a sign of "good board governance" and "increased audit committee quality" (IAASB 
2013; CII 2013; SEC 2015; CAQ 2016). Given these views, we begin by formulating three 
hypotheses to examine the determinants of these voluntary disclosures.  
First, we posit that companies facing concerns due to higher perceived auditor 
independence impairment are more likely to voluntarily disclose the factors the audit committee 
considered in reappointing the auditor to allay such concerns. Investors and regulators have long 
argued that firm procurement of higher non-audit services from the incumbent auditor threatens 
audit quality (PCAOB 2004). In addition, numerous studies provide evidence consistent with 
investors perceiving non-audit services as impairing auditor independence (Krishnan, Sami and 
Zhang 2005; Francis and Ke 2006; Chahine and Filatotchev 2011).1 Due to such negative 
perceptions, companies face undesirable consequences including lower firm value and a high cost 
of capital (Brandon, Crabtree and Maher 2004). The audit committee, which approves non-audit 
services, may choose to maintain the level of non-audit services but still has strong incentives to 
alleviate perceived auditor independence concerns to avoid its undesirable consequences. By 
demonstrating that the audit committee diligently considered different factors in reappointing the 
                                                          
1 Some studies demonstrate no evidence of association between non-audit services and impaired audit quality (e.g. 
DeFond, Raghunandan and Subramanyam 2002; Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Geiger and Rama 2003). 
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auditor despite high procurement of non-audit services, companies may hope to appease 
stakeholders concerned about the incumbent auditor’s independence.  
Second, we hypothesize that companies have greater incentives to provide auditor 
reappointment disclosures when the board is the target of investor activism campaigns. Because 
campaigns often seek to remove or replace board members, including audit committee members, 
companies have incentives to demonstrate the board’s oversight effectiveness to weaken such 
campaigns. Given that several parties view auditor reappointment disclosures as indicators of good 
board governance, companies are more likely to provide such disclosures when investor activism 
is directed at the board. 
Third, consistent with regulators’ and investors’ views, we expect companies with better 
board governance to be more likely to provide disclosures of auditor reappointment considerations 
(IAASB 2013; CII 2013; SEC 2015; CAQ 2016). Pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(hereafter referred to as SOX), audit committees are directly responsible for overseeing the 
preparation and audit of financial statements (SOX 2002). Hence, effective boards should be more 
diligent in fulfilling this responsibility. Prior literature suggests effective audit committees produce 
higher quality financial reports (e.g., Bédard, Chtourou, and Courteau 2004; Abbott, Parker, and 
Peters 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 2005; Krishnan 2005; Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou 2007; Hoitash, 
Hoitash, and Bedard 2009). Thus, we expect a positive association between audit committee 
quality and disclosures of auditor reappointment considerations. 
We manually collect 771 firm-year observations of voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors from the period 2011 to 2017 from the SEEK iNF database. We obtain 
12,387 firm-year observations of non-disclosure firms for the same period as our control sample, 
yielding a total sample of 13,158 firm-year observations. We combine this data with variables 
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obtained from Audit analytics, Boardex, Compustat, CRSP, and Capital IQ. We find results 
consistent with our three hypotheses. We find a positive association between both the level of non-
audit services procured and activism directed at the board and auditor reappointment disclosures. 
These results suggest that companies use these disclosures to create a favorable impression about 
the audit committee’s monitoring quality when they face pressure about auditor independence 
impairment and about board ineffectiveness. We also find a higher likelihood of voluntary 
disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment as audit committee financial expertise, size, 
tenure, and women directors increases, consistent with these disclosures signaling higher quality 
audit committees.  Overall, these results are consistent with audit committees perceiving that the 
disclosure of factors considered in reappointing auditors will appease investors attempting to oust 
board members or stakeholders concerned about auditor independence impairment. Despite the 
impression management incentives underlying these disclosures, the results also consistent with 
the disclosures identifying vigilant monitors - audit committees that are more likely to choose 
higher quality auditors.  
Next, we assess which of the motives, impression management or vigilant monitoring, of 
auditor reappointment disclosures is dominant in two ways. Specifically, we examine the 
implications of the disclosures on audit committee member turnover as well as the association 
between these disclosures and the likelihood that the financial statements the auditor is reappointed 
to audit will be restated in future periods. Given audit committees’ responsibility for financial 
reporting oversight (SOX 2002), it stands to reason that they are held accountable for financial 
reporting failure such as accounting misstatements. Accordingly, prior studies find increased audit 
committee turnover following restatements either because ineffective directors are blamed and 
fired, or directors voluntarily opt out of the board to salvage their reputation (Srinivasan 2005; 
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Arthaud-Day, Certo, and Dalton 2006). To the extent that voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors identifies directors who are more diligent in their oversight role, these 
disclosures should mitigate the positive association between misstatement announcements and 
director turnover. In addition, we expect these disclosures to be associated with a lower likelihood 
that the financial statements audited by the reappointed auditor will be subsequently restated.  
We find that audit committee directors are less likely to resign or be fired from the board 
in the presence of egregious misstatement announcements if the firm discloses considerations in 
auditor reappointment.  Moreover, for companies with voluntary disclosure of considerations in 
auditor reappointment, we find a lower likelihood that the financial statements audited by the 
reappointed auditor will be subsequently restated. These results provide additional evidence that 
these voluntary disclosures distinguish audit committees with more vigilant monitoring. Our 
results are robust to alternative measurements of our variables of interest and to propensity score 
matching of companies with voluntary disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment with 
control firms without such disclosures. 
Our study makes several contributions to practice and to the accounting literature. While 
investors and regulators suggest that voluntary disclosures of auditor reappointment considerations 
are made by companies with effective audit committees, we are the first to provide empirical 
evidence of this suggestion. Our evidence suggests that audit committees distinguish their vigilant 
monitoring when they voluntarily disclose the factors they consider in reappointing an incumbent 
auditor year-over-year. The results are important as regulators consider mandating this disclosure 
(SEC 2015). On the one hand, mandating the disclosures could induce audit committees to become 
vigilant monitors. On the other hand, requiring all companies to make such disclosures could 
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eliminate the use of the disclosure as an important signal of good governance because the audit 
committees with weak governance will become indistinguishable from the effective ones. 
We also contribute to several literature streams. First, we extend prior studies that examine 
the relation between non-audit services and voluntary disclosures. Prior literature examines the 
relation between the level of non-audit services and disclosures related to non-audit services 
(Omer, Bedard, and Falsetta 2006; Bedard, Falsetta, Krishnamoorthy, and Omer 2010). We 
demonstrate that auditor independence concerns about non-audit services induce companies to 
voluntarily disclose the factors the audit committee considers in reappointing the audit firm from 
which such high level of non-audit services is procured. This evidence further illuminates how 
audit committees mitigate the risks associated with non-audit services. 
Second, we contribute to the board turnover and restatement literature (e.g., Srinivasan 
2005; Arthaud-Day et al. 2006). In providing evidence of reduced audit committee turnover 
following severe restatements for companies providing disclosures of auditor reappointment 
considerations, we highlight how audit committees mitigate the reputational risks and career 
concerns associated with misstatement announcements. Also, the evidence of decreased future 
restatements for companies with such disclosures extends studies examining the remedial effects 
of corporate governance following financial reporting failure (e.g., Farber 2005).  
Finally, we extend studies on audit committee disclosures (e.g., Carcello et al. 2002; 
Rezaee et al. 2003; Pandit et al. 2006). Specifically, we isolate one crucial voluntary type of such 
disclosures – voluntary disclosures of auditor reappointment factors – and document its drivers. 
We also provide initial evidence of its implications for audit committee directors’ careers and for 
future financial reporting failure.  
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2. Background literature and hypotheses 
Audit committee oversight and auditor selection 
By law, one of the audit committee’s primary responsibility is to select, reappoint and dismiss 
auditors. While the audit committee is now more diligent in fulfilling this role in the post-SOX 
era, studies find that management still wields significant influence in auditor 
appointment/reappointment/termination decisions (Cohen et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2012). For 
example, Cohen et al. (2010) interview 30 audit managers and partners from three of the Big 4 
firms, and report that auditors assigned 53% of actual influence over auditor 
appointment/reappointment/termination to management. In contrast, despite the charge under 
SOX, auditors assign only 41% of such influence to the audit committee. Thus, according to this 
survey evidence, the audit committee is not desirably effective in executing its auditor 
appointment/reappointment/termination duties. 
In addition, companies continue to reappoint the same auditor year-over-year with auditor 
tenures spanning 100 years or longer (Erickson 2017). Given these long tenures and continuing 
financial reporting failures, shareholders are questioning the rationale and the process for 
appointing and evaluating the performance of auditors. Shareholders’ main concern is that prolong 
incumbent auditor reappointment is a mere rubber-stamp. These discussions, among other things, 
led to a PCAOB proposal on mandatory auditor rotation (which has since been abandoned). In the 
absence of mandatory rotation, audit committees have begun disclosing the factors they consider 
in selecting and/or dismissing auditors.  
On the one hand, organizational legitimacy theory suggests audit committees might use these 
disclosures to ward off negative perceptions about their oversight effectiveness (Suchman 1995). 
We posit that audit committees are more likely to have such legitimacy incentives when they 
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procure greater non-audit services and hence face stakeholder perception of auditor independence 
impairment. In addition, audit committees are likely under such pressure when investors launch 
campaigns seeking to remove board members including those on the audit committee.  On the 
other hand, signaling theory suggests audit committees with more effective oversight over auditor 
selection/dismissal will signal their type using these disclosures.  
2.1. Audit Committee Oversight and Non-audit Services 
 A wealth of anecdotal and empirical evidence provides strong support for investors 
perceiving auditor independence to be impaired when companies purchase high levels of non-audit 
services. For example, Elliot Schwartz, Council of Institutional Investors, stated: “We have 
established a very bright-line test, which is to say that the appropriate non-audit services that an 
audit firm ought to provide are zero” (PCAOB 2004, p. 67). Also, Mark Anson from CalPERS 
stated: “CalPERs has made it clear that if there is a higher cost [of hiring a tax specialist other than 
the auditor], we are willing to pay that cost, as a shareowner in these public companies, to ensure 
the integrity of the financial statements” (PCAOB 2004, p. 66). Krishnan et al. (2005) and Francis 
and Ke (2006) find that the earnings response coefficient on quarterly earnings surprises is 
decreasing in the level of non-audit fees disclosed in proxy releases. Also, higher NAS fees are 
associated with lower bond ratings, and increased underpricing of IPOs (Brandon et al. 2004; 
Chahine and Filatotchev 2011). Further, consistent with shareholders perceiving non-audit 
services as a threat to auditor independence and audit quality, Mishra, Raghunandan, and Rama 
(2005) find a negative relation between audit provided tax services and the likelihood of 
shareholders voting for auditor ratification. Raghunandan and Rama (2003) provide evidence 
consistent with non-audit services leading to loss of confidence in auditor independence and in the 
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credibility of audited financial statements, resulting in investors voting against the ratification of 
auditors (Raghunandan and Rama 2003). 
The view that the provision of non-audit services impairs auditor independence is costly to 
companies, providing incentives to mitigate this adverse perception.  Companies with higher levels 
of non-audit services bear a higher cost of both debt and equity capital (Brandon et al. 2004; 
Alsadoun et al. 2018). Organizational legitimacy theory posits that organizations may adopt 
symbols to improve their legitimacy in the face of negative stakeholder perceptions, “even if these 
supposed indicators amount to little more than face work” (Suchman 1995). Accordingly, 
managers and auditors attempt to mitigate possible negative stakeholder perceptions of non-audit 
services (Parkash and Venable 1993; Firth 1997; Hackenbrack 2003). We propose that a 
mechanism available for tempering adverse stakeholder perceptions of non-audit services is audit 
committee disclosures. By disclosing that the audit committee considered a variety of factors in 
selecting the auditor from whom they have procured the high level of non-audit services, the audit 
committee may ward off concerns about auditor independence impairment.  Hence, we 
hypothesize: 
H1: The level of non-audit services is positively associated with audit committee disclosure of 
auditor reappointment factors. 
 
 
2.2. Audit Committee Oversight and Investor Activism 
 Activist investors often launch campaigns seeking to remove or replace board members, 
including audit committee members, citing weak governance as the reason for their request. For 
example, the CtW Investment Group, one of Hewlett-Packard’s large shareholders, distributed a 
letter to shareholders stating “We urge you to vote AGAINST the re-election of directors G. 
Kennedy Thompson and John L. Hammergren, and to vote AGAINST ratification of Ernst & 
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Young LLC as independent auditor at Hewlett-Packard’s (NYSE:HPQ) annual meeting on March 
20, 2013. Despite membership changes, we believe the board is hobbled by years’ worth of poor 
judgment, lack of accountability and weak oversight of critical functions.” (Clayton 2013).  
 These campaigns are common and the activist investors highly influential. Of the 2,540 
activist campaigns in the S&P Capital IQ database launched during our sample period (2011-
2017), over half (53%) specifically sought to replace or add directors to the board. The campaigns 
are often unsuccessful in that Gow, Shin, and Srinivasan (2011) find that directors are almost twice 
as likely to leave over a two-year period if the firm faced a shareholder activist campaign. 
Moreover, the labor market severely penalizes directors when the directors are perceived as weak 
monitors (Srinivasan 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2007).  To the extent that the labor market views 
directors that leave a company after an activist campaign as underperforming directors, these 
directors are likely to also suffer negative labor market consequences. The consequences include 
reduced pay and lost board positions at other companies, particularly after financial reporting 
failure and for audit committee directors (Srinivasan 2005; Fich and Shivdasani 2007). To thwart 
the replacement attempts by these increasingly vocal and influential investors, board members may 
indicate their good governance by disclosing their careful consideration of a variety of factors in 
the reappointment of auditors. Thus, we hypothesize: 




2.3. Audit Committee Oversight and Audit Committee Quality 
 Contractually, under SOX, audit committees are directly responsible for selecting and 
dismissing auditors (SOX 2002). Therefore, to be effective, audit committees must diligently fulfill 
this role, leading to higher audit quality. We can thus infer that companies with high audit quality 
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have more effective audit committees, identified as larger audit committee size and greater audit 
committee financial expertise (e.g., Bédard et al. 2004; Abbott et al. 2004; Agrawal and Chadha 
2005; Krishnan 2005; Zhanget al. 2007; Hoitash et al. 2009). Signaling theory (e.g., Spence 1973) 
suggests more effective audit committees will signal their type by disclosing information that 
uniquely demonstrates their effectiveness in appointing/terminating auditors. Consistent with this 
theory, regulators and investors view disclosures of auditor reappointment considerations to be 
indicative of effective audit committees (IAASB 2013; CII 2013; SEC 2015; CAQ 2016).  The 
Council for Institutional Investors in their Policies on Corporate Governance explicitly advocate 
detailed audit committee reporting. They state: “The report should include a fact specific 
explanation for not changing the company’s auditor if the committee chooses to renew the 
engagement of an auditor with more than 10 consecutive years of service, or if the auditor is 
retained despite knowledge of substantive deficiencies identified during the committee’s review 
of the considerations described above.” To the extent that audit committees perceive the disclosure 
of audit reappointment factors to be a viable signal of good governance and a legitimacy enhancing 
tool, we hypothesize: 
H3: Audit committee quality is positively associated with audit committee disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors. 
 
2.4. Auditor Reappointment Disclosures: Window Dressing or Vigilant Monitoring 
Our hypotheses so far examine whether the “window dressing” (H1 and H2) and the 
“vigilant monitoring” (H3) motives for disclosing auditor reappointment factors exist. Tests of 
these hypotheses would however not identify the dominant motive underlying these disclosures.  
To address this objective, we examine the implications of the disclosures on audit committee 
member turnover in periods of financial reporting failures as well as the association between these 
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disclosures and future audit quality as proxied by financial misstatements. Given audit committees’ 
responsibility for financial reporting oversight (SOX 2002), it stands to reason that they are held 
accountable for financial reporting failure such as egregious accounting misstatements. 
Accordingly, prior studies find increased audit committee turnover following restatements either 
because ineffective directors are blamed and fired, or directors voluntarily opt out of the board to 
salvage their reputation (Srinivasan 2005; Arthaud-Day et al. 2006).  Specifically, Srinivasan 
(2005) examine the consequences of earnings restatements for outside directors and particularly 
audit committee members. He finds that while audit committee members at restating firms rarely 
experience penalties from lawsuits and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) actions, they 
experience severe labor market penalties by exiting both the board of the restating firms and other 
boards.  Arthaud-Day et al. (2006) provide corroborating evidence documenting approximately a 
70 percent exit likelihood for audit committee members from restating firms. 
To the extent that voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors identifies directors 
who are more diligent in their oversight role, these disclosures should mitigate the positive 
association between financial reporting failures and audit committee director turnover. On the 
other hand, if the disclosures on average represent window dressing, they should exacerbate the 
positive association between financial reporting failures and audit committee director turnover.  
Given these contrasting views, we formulate a non-directional hypothesis as follows.  
H4: Audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors is not associated with  
   Audit committee director firing/resignation in periods of financial reporting failures. 
 
In addition, if the “vigilant monitoring” motive dominates, we expect these disclosures to 
reduce poor audit quality of the financial statements the auditor is reappointed to audit. 
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Specifically, we expect audit committee voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors to 
be associated with a lower likelihood that the financial statements audited by the reappointed 
auditor will be subsequently restated. Whereas, we should find the disclosures to be positively 
associated with future restatements if the “window dressing” motive dominates. Given that the 
sign of the relation between audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors and the 
reappointed auditors’ misstatements is unclear, we make the following non-directional prediction. 
H5: Audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors is not associated with future 
restatements. 
 
3. Sample selection and research design 
Sample selection and data source 
The sample consists of all U.S. publicly-traded companies with available data in the 
Compustat, Audit Analytics, and BoardEx databases from fiscal year 2011 to 2017. We obtain 
data on investor activism directed at the board of directors from the Standard & Poors Capital IQ 
database. We begin the sample in fiscal year 2011 because voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointments factors are rare until fiscal year 2011. We exclude financial firms because their 
financial reporting is different from non-financial firms, and they have different corporate 
governance structures. After excluding financial firms and firms with missing data in the 
Compustat, Audit Analytics, and BoardEx databases, the primary sample consists of 13,158 firm-
year observations.  
To identify firms disclosing auditor reappointment factors and the exact date of the 
disclosures, we manually search SEEK iNF, by SeekEdgar and their database on the cloud of all 
proxy statements (DEF14A), 10-Ks, 8-Ks, and 6-Ks filed with the SEC and housed on the EDGAR 
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database.2 We use a combination of proximity and exact search strings to obtain a listing of firms 
making the disclosures. Appendix A, Panel A provides a listing of our search strings, and Appendix 
A, Panel B provides two examples of audit committee voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors for Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: VRTR), which was first 
disclosed in the company’s 2012 proxy statement (Part I) and Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc. 
(NASDAQ: WBA), which was first disclosed in the company’s 2016 proxy statement (Part II). As 
shown in the two examples in Panel B, reasons for reappointing the auditor differ from firm to 
firm, and the length of the disclosures can range from a few sentences to detailed description of 
factors considered. 
Table 1 presents the sample selection and industry membership. Panel A describes the 
primary sample, and Panel B breaks the primary sample into firm-years with and without voluntary 
disclosure of auditor reappointment factors. From Panel B, in 2011, only 27 (or 1.41%) of firms 
in our sample disclosed factors the audit committee considered in reappointing the auditor. By 
2017, the number of firms disclosing auditor reappointment factors increased to 222 (or 12.80%), 
and there are 771 firm-year observations of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
from 2011 to 2017. In untabulated analysis, the number of S&P 500 firms disclosing factors 
considered in reappointing the auditor increased from 5.34% in 2011 to 30.43% in 2017, 
suggesting that the rate of disclosure is increasing over time and higher among larger firms.3 Panel 
C shows industry membership of the primary sample, and how the primary sample compares to 
all population of non-financial firms in the Compustat database during the sample period.  
<<< Insert Table 1 here >>> 
                                                          
2 In our sample, almost all firms disclosing auditor reappointment factors do so via their proxy statements (form DEF 
14A). 
3 This is consistent with a 2017 report by Ernest and Young Center for Board Matters. The report documents that the 
number of Fortune 100 firms disclosing considerations in auditor reappointment increased from 18% in 2012 to 62% 
in 2018 (seehttps://www.ey.com/en_us/board-matters/audit-committee-reporting-to-shareholders-in-2018). 
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Empirical model for hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 
 To examine whether perceived impaired audit quality (Hypothesis 1), investor activism 
directed at board of directors (Hypotheses 2), and audit committee quality (Hypothesis 3) are 
associated with the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors, we 
estimate the regression specified in Equation (1).  
VOLDISC = f {NASRATIO, ACTIVISM, ACQUALITY, Control variables}         (1) 
 
Dependent variable: Likelihood of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
(VOLDISC) 
The dependent variable, VOLDISC measures the existence of a voluntary disclosure of 
audit committee considerations in auditor reappointment, and equals 1 if the firm discloses in the 
proxy statement the factors the audit committee considered in reappointing the auditor for the 
coming fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
Test variable: Perceived impaired auditor independence (NASRATIO) 
The first independent test variable, NASRATIO measures perceived threat to audit quality. 
Investors and regulators have long viewed higher non-audit services from the incumbent auditor 
as a threat to auditor independence and audit quality (Simunic 1984; Beck et al. 1988a; Sharma 
and Sidhu 2001; Frankel et al. 2002; Kinney et al. 2004), and the market responds negatively to 
higher non-audit services to the incumbent auditor (Brandon et al. 2004; Krishnan et al. 2005; 
Francis and Ke 2006; Chahine and Filatotchev 2011). Section 202 of SOX requires the audit 
committee to pre-approve and disclose amount of non-audit services to the incumbent auditor. The 
academic literature often uses the amount of non-audit service fees relative to total fees (non-audit 
fees plus audit fees) as proxy for the threat to auditor independence (e.g. Ashbaugh, LaFond, and 
Mayhew 2003; Naiker, Sharma, and Sharma 2012; DeFond and Zhang 2014). Therefore, we 
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measure NASRATIO as the ratio of total non-audit services fees to total fees paid to the external 
auditor during the current fiscal year.4 Audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
(a voluntary disclosure) is typically contained in the same proxy statement which firms use to 
disclose the amount of non-audit services fees relative to audit fees (a required disclosure). As 
indicated previously, we expect the likelihood of disclosure of considerations in auditor 
reappointment to be higher when amount of non-audit services fees relative to audit fees is higher. 
Thus, we expect the coefficient of NASRATIO to be positive.   
Test variable: Investor activism communication to remove (appoint) directors from (to) the board 
of directors (ACTIVISM) 
Our second independent test variable, ACTIVISM captures investor activism communication 
directed at the board of directors. In the context of this paper, the board of directors of a firm is 
said to experience “investor activism” in year t if an investor files material that seeks to remove or 
nominate directors to the firm's board of directors or a committee of the firm’s board of directors 
in the 12 months subsequent to the proxy filling date. Thus, ACTIVISM is an indicator variable 
that equals 1 if the firm experiences investor activism directed towards the board of directors 
during the 12 months preceding the proxy filling date, and zero otherwise.5 We expect the 
likelihood of disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment to be higher for firms with 
investor activism pressure. Thus, we expect a positive coefficient on ACTIVISM. 
Test variable: Audit committee quality (ACQUALITY) 
The nature of voluntary disclosure we examine in this study is particularly driven by the 
                                                          
4 In supplementary tests, we examine alternative measures of NAS fees such as the natural logarithm of total NAS 
fees (LOG_NAS), ratio of total NAS to audit fees (NAS_TO_AUFEE), and the dollar value of NAS fees ($NAS) that 
have been employed in prior research (DeFond et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003; Raghunandan et al. 2003; Naiker et al. 
2013). 
5 In the additional analyses section, our results persist when we use the log of the number of investor activism 
communication seeking to remove or nominate directors to the firm’s board. 
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audit committee of the board of directors. The literature suggests that an audit committee 
composed of financial experts, more directors, directors with experience within the firm’s own 
board and other boards, and female directors is more likely to be effective at monitoring the 
external auditor (e.g. DeFond, Hann and Hu 2005; Naiker and Sharma 2009; Srinidhi, Gul and 
Tsui 2011). Therefore, our test variable, ACQUALITY represents one of the following audit 
committee quality factors: the percentage of audit committee directors who are financial experts 
(ACEXPRT), the number of audit committee directors (ACSIZE), tenure of audit committee 
directors on the firm’s own board (ACTEN), external directorships held by audit committee 
directors (ACSOSCAP), and percentage of female directors on the audit committee (ACWOM). We 
expect audit committee director quality variables to be positively associated with VOLDISC. 
Independent control variables:  
We control for several firm characteristics used in the voluntary disclosure literature (e.g. 
Healy and Palepu 2001; Chen, Chen, and Cheng 2008; Francis, Nanda, and Olsson 2008). More 
specifically, these variables include firm size (ASSETS), growth (GROWTH), leverage (LEV), 
losses (LOSS), whether the firm operates in a litigious industry (LIT), return on assets (ROA), and 
an ex-post measure of the need to raise additional financing (XFIN). Based on the prior studies, 
we predict a positive coefficient for ASSETS and LIT, a negative coefficient for XFIN, and offer 
no directional prediction on the coefficients for GROWTH, LEV, LOSS, and ROA. We include the 
variable SP500 to control for a firm’s membership in the S&P 500 index because, as indicated 
previously, the rate of disclosure of auditor reappointment factors is higher (lower) for S&P 500 
(non-S&P 500) firms.  
We control for BIGN to capture whether the firm is audited by a big 4 audit firm. To capture 
poor financial reporting quality, we control for auditor discovery and reporting of material internal 
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control weaknesses (ICW). We expect a positive coefficient on SP500 and BIGN but offer no 
directional prediction on the coefficient for ICW. In addition to our test variables which are mainly 
corporate governance variables, we include BIND to account for the percentage of independent 
directors on the board and INSTOWN to account for the percentage of institutional ownership of 
the firm’s common stock. We expect BIND and INSTOWN to be positively associated with 
VOLDISC. Finally, we control for year and industry fixed effects using the Fama-French 12 
industry portfolio. All continuous variables in this study are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% 
of their distribution. All the regressions in this study (tabulated and untabulated) are estimated with 
standard errors adjusted based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances. In Appendix 
B, we define the dependent variables used in the main analyses (Panel A) and the additional 
analyses (Panel B), test variables used in the main (Panel C) and additional (Panel D) analyses, 
and the control variables (Panel E). 
Empirical model and variables for hypothesis 4  
 Srinivasan (2005) finds that financial reporting failures in the form of accounting 
restatements carry significant career consequences, in the form of firings and resignations for 
audit committee directors. To gain insights on whether audit committee voluntary disclosure of 
auditor reappointment factors is perceived to be vigilant monitoring of the auditor as contained in 
the fourth hypothesis (H4), we estimate the moderation regression in equation (2) below. The 
moderation regression examines whether audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors mitigates a positive association between accounting restatements and audit committee 
director firings/resignations. 




Dependent variable: Audit committee director firing/resignation (AC_EXIT) 
 The dependent variable, AC_EXIT is an indicator variable that equals 1 if one or more 
audit committee directors get fired or resign from the board within 12 months of egregious 
financial restatement announcement (defined below), and zero otherwise.6  
Independent test variables: RESTANN, VOLDISC, RESTANN×VOLDISC 
 The dependent variable, RESTANN equals 1 if the firm announces a restatement of 
previously issued financial statements in the current fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Restatements 
announcements are defined to include Item 4.02 non-reliance restatements as these are material 
and more egregious, and receive negative market reactions, compared to non-material revision 
restatements (e.g., Hennes, Leone, and Miller 2008; Burks 2011; Iskander-Datta and Jia 2012). 
We limit the non-reliance restatement announcement to those having a negative impact on 
previously reported financial statements because these restatements elicit audit committee 
departures from the board (Srinivasan 2005).7 Consistent with Srinivasan (2005), we expect audit 
committee director departures from the board to increase following the announcement of egregious 
financial restatements. Thus, we expect the coefficient on RESTANN to be positively associated 
with AC_EXIT. To examine H4, which is whether voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors mitigates this relationship, we include VOLDISC (as defined for Equation (1)) and interact 
this variable with RESTANN to create our primary variable of interest, RESTANN × VOLDISC. To 
the extent that these voluntary disclosures are indicative of vigilant monitoring (window dressing), 
we should observe a negative coefficient (a positive coefficient) on RESTANN×VOLDISC. 
                                                          
6 In the additional analyses section, our results persist when we modify AC_EXIT to equal the log of the number of 
audit committee directors who gets fired or resign from the board within 12 months following egregious restatement 
announcement. Our results also persist when we modify AC_EXIT to equal the percentage of audit committee directors 
who gets fired or resign from the board within 12 months following egregious restatement announcement 
7 Our results are qualitatively similar when we do not apply this restriction. 
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Independent control variables 
 Consistent with the extant literature, we control for variables associated with board, 
particularly audit committee director turnover (Gilson 1990; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Farrell 
and Whidbee 2000; Yermack 2003; Srinivasan 2005). We control for ACTIVISM, ACSIZE, 
ACEXPRT, ACTEN, ACSOSCAP, and ACWOM, ASSETS, GROWTH, LEV, LIT, ROA, ICW, and 
INSTOWN. These variables are as defined for Equation (1) above. We also control for average 
audit committee director age (ACAGE), restructuring activities (RESTR), CEO turnover 
(CEOTURN), and new CEO (NEWCEO). We expect ACTIVISM, LIT, ICW, ACSIZE, RESTR, 
ACSOSCAP, INSTOWN, ACAGE, RESTR, CEOTURN, and NEWCEO to be positively associated 
with AC_EXIT, and GROWTH, ROA, ACEXPRT and ACWOM to be negatively associated with 
AC_EXIT. We do not offer a directional prediction on the coefficients for ASSETS, LEV, and 
ACTEN. 
Empirical model and variables for hypothesis 5 
 To test the effect of audit committee voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
on future audit quality as demonstrated in hypothesis 5 (H5), we examine the association between 
voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors during the current proxy filing season and 
the likelihood that the financial statements the auditor has been reappointed to audit will be 
subsequently restated in future periods.8 We employ the likelihood of restatement as a proxy for 
audit quality because it is the most actual and direct measure of poor audit quality during the 
current period (Shibano 1990; DeFond and Zhang 2014), and the absence of a restatement of 
                                                          
8 Our restatement sample for the audit committee director firings or resignations test in Equation (2) is different from 
the restatement sample for the audit quality test in this section, Equation (3). The restatement sample used in Equation 
2 are egregious restatement announcements relating to prior years’ audited financial restatements. The restatements 
sample in Equation (3) relates to egregious misstatements during the fiscal years the auditor is reappointed to audit 
(i.e. subsequent to the disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment). 
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current period’s financial statements in future periods is indicative of good audit quality in the 
current period (DeFond and Zhang 2014).9 We employ the functional form specified in Equation 
(3) below, with the dependent, test, and control variables defined in Appendix B: 
IS_REST= f {VOLDISC, Control variables}              (3) 
Dependent variable: Likelihood that the financial statements the auditor is reappointed to audit 
is restated in future periods (IS_REST) 
The dependent variable IS_REST, is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the annual 
financial statements the auditor is reappointed to audit are subsequently restated in future periods, 
and 0 otherwise. We confine our restatement sample to Item 4.02 non-reliance restatement, and 
we identify restated financial statements from the respective fiscal year (2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 
2015 and 2016) to July, 2019.10 We exclude fiscal year 2017 from the restatement sample because 
we require a minimum of 24 months between the fiscal year end and our last data collection date 
to allow firms to discover misstatements and restate previously issued financial statements. Our 
approach is consistent with the literature because it often takes several months and sometimes 
years before a restatement is announced and reported (Karpoff et al. 2008a, 2008b; Denis 2012; 
deHaan et al. 2013).  
Independent test variables: VOLDISC 
The test variable, VOLDISC is as defined for Equation (1). If the dominant motive for 
audit committee voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors is vigilant monitoring 
(window dressing), the coefficient on VOLDISC should be negative (positive). 
                                                          
9 A concurrent study, Bratten, Causholli, and Sulcaj (2019) examines the association between audit committee 
voluntary disclosures (in general) and audit quality. The authors indicate they are unable to examine the likelihood of 
restatement as proxy for audit quality due to limitations in the data employed in their study. Our manual data collection 
which identifies these disclosures as far back from fiscal year 2011 enables us to examine the less subjective measure 
of audit quality - restatements.  
10 Consistent with the literature examining misstated periods, there are more financial restatement observations in the 
early periods of our sample (e.g. fiscal 2011 and 2012) compared to later periods of sample (e.g. fiscal 2015 and 2016).  
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Independent control variables 
 We include a comprehensive set of control variables capturing firm, auditor characteristics, 
prior audit quality and governance characteristics. We draw these control variables from the prior 
literature on financial restatements (e.g., Burns and Kedia 2006; Efendi et al. 2007). The control 
variables, which are previously defined for Equations (1) and (2) above, are RESTANN, ACEXPRT, 
ACSIZE, ASSETS, GROWTH, LEV, LOSS, ROA, BIGN, ICW, BIND, INSTOWN, and RESTR. The 
additional control variables are foreign operations (FOROPS), acquisition activities (MERGER), 
and audit fees (AUFEE). We expect a positive (negative) coefficient on RESTANN, LEV, ICW, 
RESTR, FOROPS, and MERGER (BIND, ACEXPRT, and ACSIZE). We do not offer directional 
predictions on the coefficients for ASSETS, GROWTH, LOSS, ROA, BIGN, INSTOWN and 
AUFEE. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Descriptive statistics  
We present the descriptive statistics of our variables in Panels A through D of Table 2. 
From Panel A, on average, 5.86 percent of firms in our sample disclose auditor reappointment 
factors. The unadjusted mean and median NAS fees are $652,492 and $119,091, respectively. The 
mean (median) NASRATIO is 0.141 (0.106). From Panel B, the mean and median NARATIO for 
firms which make (do not make) voluntary disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment 
(VOLDISC) are 0.186 (0.139) and 0.152 (0.103), respectively; the mean difference test statistic is 
significant (p < 0.01). From Panel A, on average, 5.68 percent of firms in our sample received 
activism communication directed at the board of directors (ACTIVISM). From Panel B, the mean 
and median ACTIVISM for firms which make (do not make) voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors are 0.104 (0.054) and 0.00 (0.00), respectively; the mean difference test 
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statistic is significant (p < 0.01). These statistics provide initial evidence that firms which disclose 
auditor reappointment factors have higher NASRATIO and experience investor activism against 
the board of directors than firms that do not.  
We turn our attention to the audit committee quality variables. From Panel A, the mean 
(median) ACEXPRT, SIZE, ACTEN, ACSOSCAP, and ACWOM are 0.521 (0.500), 1.639 (1.609), 
2.087 (2.111), 0.982 (0.916), and 0.121 (0.120), respectively. From Panel B, on average, 
ACEXPRT of firms which make (do not make) voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors is 60.9% (51.5%); the mean difference test statistic is significant (p < 0.01). On average, 
ACSIZE of firms which make (do not make) voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
is 1.7 (1.6); the mean difference test statistic is significant (p < 0.01). Similarly, on average, 
ACTEN of firms which make (do not make) voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
is 2.13 (2.08); the mean difference test statistic is significant (p < 0.01). On average, ACSOSCAP 
of firms which make (do not make) voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors is 1.02 
(0.98); the mean difference test statistic is significant (p < 0.01). Finally, on average ACWOM of 
firms which make (do not make) voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors is 18.7% 
(11.7%); the mean difference test statistic is significant (p < 0.01). Collectively, the above statistics 
provide initial evidence that disclosure of auditor reappointment factors increases with audit 
committee quality. 
From Panel A of Table 2, the mean (median) AC_EXIT is 0.024 (0.000). From Panel C, the 
mean and median AC_EXIT for firms which make (do not make) voluntary disclosure of 
considerations in auditor reappointment are 0.031 (0.059) and 0.00 (0.00), respectively; the mean 
difference test statistic is significant (p < 0.05). Similarly, from Panel C, the mean and median 
AC_EXIT for firms that experience (do not experience) a restatement announcement are 0.121 
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(0.062) and 0.00 (0.00), respectively; the mean difference test statistic is significant (p < 0.01). 
Taken together, on a univariate basis, audit committee directors are more likely to be fired or resign 
from the board following the announcement of egregious restatements and are less likely to do so 
when the firm discloses considerations in auditor reappointment. 
Finally, from Panel A of Table 2, the mean (median) likelihood that the financial 
restatement the auditor is reappointed to audit will be restated in future periods (IS_REST) is 0.057 
(0.000). From Panel D, the mean and median IS_REST for firms which make (do not make) 
voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors (VOLDISC) are 0.026 (0.050) and 0.000 
(0.000), respectively; the mean difference test statistic is significant (p < 0.01). This suggests that, 
on a univariate basis, the likelihood of future restatement of the financial statements the auditor is 
reappointed to audit decreases for firms that disclose considerations in auditor reappointment. The 
descriptive statistics for all control variables are generally consistent with the literature. 
>>> Insert Table 2 here>>> 
Table 3 presents the correlation between variables in the main regressions. From Table 3, 
all correlations are below the 0.80 multicollinearity threat threshold (Kennedy 1992). Moreover, 
the highest of all untabulated variance-inflation factors is 3.015. This is well below the 
recommended threshold of 10, beyond which multicollinearity may be a problem (Kennedy 1992).  
>>> Insert Table 3 here>>> 
Multivariate analyses 
Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 predicts that the likelihood of audit committee disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors (VOLDISC) increases with higher perceived threat to auditor independence 
(NASRATIO) and shareholder activism communications to remove or nominate directors to or 
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from the board (ACTIVISM). Table 4 presents the logistic regression results for Equation (1). From 
Table 4, NASRATIO has a positive coefficient that is significant at p <0.01. The results suggest 
that, overall, firms are more likely to disclose auditor reappointment factors when perception of 
impaired auditor independence is higher. Further, in untabulated analyses, the marginal effects of 
NASRATIO on VOLDISC is economically meaningful as we find that moving from the first quartile 
to the third quartile of NASRATIO results in a 36.08 percent increase in likelihood that a firm 
discloses auditor reappointment factors.11 Similarly, from Table 4, ACTIVISM has a positive 
coefficient that is significant at p <0.01. The results suggest that, overall, firms are more likely to 
disclose auditor reappointment factors if the firm receives activism communication seeking to 
remove or appoint directors to the board. The economic significance calculations indicate that, on 
average, a one standard deviation increase in ACTIVISM is associated with a 14.68% increase in 
VOLDISC.12 Taken together, higher perception of impaired auditor independence and activism 
communication seeking to remove or appoint new directors to the board are important 
determinants of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors. The findings from 
hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest audit committees are making these voluntary disclosures in response 
to investor pressure.  
Hypothesis 3 predicts that audit committee quality increases the likelihood of audit 
committee voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors. From Table 4, we note four of 
the five audit committee quality variables; ACEXPRT, ACSIZE, ACTEN, and ACWOM are positive 
                                                          
11 We use the “margins” function in STATA to estimate the adjusted predicted probability of VOLDISC at the first 
and third quartiles of the test variable, NASRATIO, while holding all other variables at their mean values (Williams 
2012). The STATA margins estimate of adjusted predicted probabilities at the first and third quartiles of NASRATIO 
are 0.0298865 and 0.0406693. The change in predicted probabilities equates to an increase of 36.08%. The economic 
effect based on [exp(1.697 )-1]*0.136 equates to 60.62% increase. 
12 We do not compute economic significance for ACTIVISM results using the “margins” function in STATA because, 
as shown in Table 2, the first and third quartiles of ACTIVISM are 0.000. Instead, we calculate economic significance 
as [exp(0.492 )-1]*0.231=0.14682. 
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and significantly (p < 0.01, p < 0.01, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, respectively) associated with VOLDISC.13  
The results indicate that high quality audit committees are more likely to voluntary disclose auditor 
reappointment factors. Thus, contrary to results of hypotheses 1 and 2, the results of hypothesis 3 
suggest these disclosures may be indicative of vigilant monitoring of the auditor. Thus, these 
results support both a window dressing (hypotheses 1 and 2) and a vigilant monitoring (hypothesis 
1) motive for voluntarily disclosing factors the audit committee considered in reappointing the 
external auditor. 
Turning to the control variables, firm size, firms in litigious industries, and membership in 
S&P 500 increase the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors, but the 
ex-post measure of the need to raise additional financing, auditor discovery and report of material 
internal control weaknesses, and higher board independence decrease the likelihood of the 
disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment.14 
>>> Insert Table 4 here>> 
Hypothesis 4 
We present the logistic regression results for H4 in Table 5. First, we test the association 
between restatement announcement (RESTANN) and audit committee director firings/resignations 
(AC_EXIT) and present the results in Column 1. We note that RESTANN is positive and 
significantly (p < 0.01) associated with AC_EXIT. This is consistent with findings in Srinivasan 
(2005) suggesting that board of directors, particularly audit committee directors are more likely to 
depart from the board following egregious misstatement announcements. Column 2 presents the 
results of the interaction effect – H4. The results in Column 2 are interesting. First, the coefficient 
                                                          
13 ACSOSCAP is not significantly associated with VOLDISC. 
14 Results on board independence may be due to the fact that the traditional measure of board independence used in 
this study does not capture actual board independence. 
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on the interaction term, RESTANN×VOLDISC is negative and significantly (P < 0.01) associated 
with AC_EXIT. This indicates that audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
decreases the likelihood that audit committee directors get fired or resign from the board when the 
firm experience egregious restatement announcements. Next, we turn our attention to results on 
RESTANN and VOLDISC individually. The coefficient on RESTANN continues to be positive and 
significantly (p < 0.01), while the coefficient on VOLDISC is negative and significantly (P < 0.5) 
associated with AC_EXIT. The results suggest that despite the negative interaction effect, 
VOLDISC (RESTANN) is individually negatively (positively) associated with audit committee 
director firings/resignations. Collectively, the results suggest that these voluntary disclosures are 
indicative of vigilant monitoring because audit committee members of firms that disclose auditor 
reappointment factors are more likely to remain on the board in periods of financial reporting 
failures. Further, our findings extend Srinivasan (2005) by providing evidence that audit 
committee firings/resignations following egregious financial restatement diminishes when firms 
voluntary disclose auditor reappointment factors.  
>>> Insert Table 5 here>>> 
Hypothesis 5 
Table 6 presents results for the regression of IS_REST on the control variables and our test 
variable, VOLDISC. The results indicate a significant negative association between VOLDISC and 
IS_REST (p < 0.05). The negative coefficient on VOLDISC suggests that the likelihood that the 
financial statements the auditor is reappointed to audit will be restated in future period decreases 
among firms disclosing auditor reappointment factors. The economic significance calculations 
indicate that, on average, a one standard deviation increase in VOLDISC is associated with a 7.62% 
decrease in IS_REST. Thus, voluntary disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment during 
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the current proxy filing season indicates high audit quality of the financial statements the auditor 
is reappointed to audit. 
In summary, the empirical results for H4 and H5 suggests that, on average, audit committee 
voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors is more indicative of audit committee 
vigilant monitoring of the auditor than of window dressing. 
>>> Insert Table 6 here>>> 
5. Additional analyses 
Controlling endogeneity using Propensity Score Matching and instrumental variables 
Our empirical models examining the effect of audit committee disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors on audit committee turnover and restatements pose endogeneity concerns 
because the disclosure is a choice activity. As shown in Table 2, only about 5.9% of firms in our 
sample disclose auditor reappointment factors. Although the empirical models estimating the 
effect of VOLDISC on AC_EXIT and IS_REST control for several variables that can influence the 
choice to disclose considerations in auditor reappointment, VOLDISC could still be driven by 
observable firm and governance characteristics. For example, it is possible that observable firm 
size and audit committee variables correlate with VOLDISC and AC_EXIT, or with VOLDISC and 
IS_REST. We address this sample selection bias concern in several ways. First, the VOLDISC and 
AC_EXIT (IS_REST) models each control for firm size and several audit committee variables. 
Second, as shown in Table 3, the correlation between VOLDISC and firm size (ASSETS) is 0.158 
and the highest level of correlations among VOLDISC and the audit committee characteristics 
measures (ACSIZE, ACEXPRT, ACTEN, ACSOSCAP, ACWOM) is 0.143. These low correlations 
suggest that firm size and audit committee characteristics are unlikely to affect the main results. 
Finally, for completeness, we address potential endogenous effects arising from observable 
 29 
 
characteristics using propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) and omitted 
correlated variables using two-stage regression analyses. 
Using PSM helps us reduce functional form misspecification because we are able to obtain 
a sample of disclosure and nondisclosure firms that are similar across several dimensions 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Shipman, Swanquist and Whited 2016; DeFond, Erkens and Zhang 
2016). Despite this benefit, Shipman et al. (2016) discuss several limitations of PSM. The 
limitations are driven mostly by studies that coerce a treatment construct that is a continuous 
measure and inappropriate design choices. On the contrary, our treatment variable, VOLDISC, is 
binary, which eliminates potential decreasing treatment variation associated with coarsening a 
continuous treatment construct as discussed in Shipman et al. (2016). Further, we follow the advice 
of Shipman et al. (2016) to construct our PSM sample, which we discuss below.  
First, to obtain the PSM sample, we create a non-disclosure control sample with the closest 
probabilities of a disclosure firm. We use Equation (1) to estimate the likelihood of voluntary 
disclosure of auditor reappointment factors. As discussed previously, Equation (1) includes a broad 
range of firm-specific and governance determinants of voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors. We use the variables that are significant in Equation (1) to estimate 
propensity scores separately for each sample year, controlling for industry membership. Overall, 
the one-to-one match with replacement and 0.1 caliper yields 771 (549) non-disclosure control 
sample for the AC_EXIT (IS_REST) samples, respectively.15 Together, the voluntary disclosure 
firms plus the non-disclosure matched-firms yields 1,542 (1,098) firm-year observations for the 
AC_EXIT (IS_REST) samples, respectively. 16 We present the results of our PSM analyses in Table 
                                                          
15 One-to-one match mitigates concerns associated with sampling variance (Shipman et al. 2016; DeFond et al. 2016). 
16 Sample size reduces from 1,542 observations for AC_EXIT to 1,098 observations for IS_REST because we exclude 
fiscal year 2017 (total 444 observations) from the IS_REST model. There are 222 voluntary disclosure firms in fiscal 
year 2017 and 222 matched peers. 
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7. First, we present the means of variables used to create the matched sample for the AC_EXIT 
PSM model in Panel A of Table 7. Following the advice of Shipman et al. (2016), we provide the 
means comparison tests to demonstrate the match quality. As shown in Panel A of Table 7, the t-
values indicate there are no significant differences in the means of variables for firms that disclose 
considerations in auditor reappointment (VOLDISC=1) and the matched peers (VOLDISC=0).17  
Next, we re-estimate the regressions in Equation (2), and report the results in Panel B of 
Table 7. From Column A, RESTANN is positive and significantly associated with AC_EXIT. Most 
importantly, from Column B, the interaction variable, RESTANN × VOLDISC is negative and 
significantly (p < 0.01) associated with AC_EXIT. We demonstrate that the results on RESTANN 
and RESTANN × VOLDISC are quantitatively similar to those obtained in the primary analyses. 
Thus, audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors significantly diminishes the 
positive association between egregious restatement announcement and audit committee director 
firings/resignations.  
Finally, we re-estimate the regressions in Equation (3), and report the results in Panel C of 
Table 7. From Panel C, VOLDISC is negative and significantly (p < 0.05) associated with IS_REST, 
suggesting that the negative association between voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors and the likelihood that the financial statements the auditor is reappointed to audit will be 
restated in future periods persists with a PSM sample.  
>>> Insert Table 7 here>>> 
Despite the advantages of PSM discussed above and our approach in constructing, 
evaluating the matches, and interpreting results, Shipman et al. (2016) stresses the need to 
supplement PSM with alternative designs because, among other things, the smaller PSM sample 
                                                          
17 In untabulated results, we find no significant differences in the means of variables in the IS_REST PSM sample. 
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could affect generalizability of our findings. Further, a PSM approach does not address sample 
selection bias arising from omitted correlated variables. We employ a two-stage regression design 
to alleviate these concerns. In the first-stage we use a VOLDISC determinants model as in Equation 
(1). From this model, we then compute the predicted value of VOLDISC, PREVOLDISC. The 
variables that serve as our instruments in Equation (1) are whether the firm is a member of the 
S&P 500 (IS_SP500) and the ex post measure of the need to raise additional financing (XFIN). 
These variables serve as our instruments because, as shown in Table 4, these variables are 
significantly associated with VOLDISC but the prior research do not show potential linkages 
between these variables and AC_EXIT or IS_REST, and these variables are not subsequently 
employed in the AC_EXIT or IS_REST models.18  
We employ PREVOLDIC as the independent variable in the second-stage regressions using 
AC_EXIT and IS_REST as the dependent measures. A significant PREVOLDISC will indicate that 
any bias arising from omitted variables that are correlated with voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors is not a concern (Lennox et al., 2011).  
We report the results of the two-stage regressions in Table 8. Columns A and B present the 
second-stage regression results for Equations (2) and (3), respectively. From Column A, the 
interaction variable, RESTANN × PREVOLDISC is negative and significantly (p < 0.01) associated 
with AC_EXIT, suggesting that voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors reduces the 
positive association between egregious restatement announcement and audit committee member 
firing or resignation. Interestingly, the coefficient on RESTANN is no longer significant in the 
presence of the significant interaction term, suggesting that voluntary disclosure of auditor 
                                                          
18 We note limitation in identifying sufficient instruments for the two-stage analyses in our setting because many of 
the determinants of audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors are also predictors of audit committee 
departures and likelihood of restatement. While this is not unique to our study, the two instruments we identify and 
strong determinants of VOLDISC, but do not affect AC_EXIT or IS_REST.  
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reappointment factors significantly attenuates (or eliminates) the positive association between 
egregious restatement announcement and audit committee member firing or resignation.  From 
Column B, the variable PREVOLDISC is negative and significantly (p < 0.01) associated with 
IS_REST, suggesting that voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors reduces the 
likelihood that the financial statements the auditor is reappointed to audit will be restated in future 
periods. Collectively, the results support the findings in the primary analyses by demonstrating 
that omitted correlated variables are unlikely to have impacted the AC_EXIT and IS_REST results.  
Taken together, the findings from the PSM and the two-stage analyses support the findings 
in the primary analyses by demonstrating that selection bias on observable and unobservable 
determinants of voluntary disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment are unlikely to 
have impacted the AC_EXIT and IS_REST results.  
>>> Insert Table 8 here>>> 
Alternative variable measurement 
We made several variable measurement decisions throughout the primary analyses. In this 
section, we consider alternative specifications of our primary variables of interest to provide 
comfort that our inferences are not driven by these choices.  
Alternative measures of test variables in the determinants model (Equation 1) 
In this section, we consider how alternative measures of perceived impaired audit quality 
and investor activism pressure affects likelihood of voluntary disclosure of considerations in 
auditor reappointment. First, we proxy for perceived impaired audit quality using the ratio of NAS 
fees to audit fees (NAS_TO_AUD), the natural log of total NAS fees (LOGNAS), and the dollar 
value of NAS fees ($NAS). We re-estimate Equation (1) for each of these modifications. The 
results (untabulated) are similar in sign and statistical significance for each of the above 
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modifications as those presented in the primary analysis. Finally, we specify investor activism 
against the board of directors using the natural log of the total number of activism communications 
directed to the board of directors during the fiscal year (ACTVISM_SEV). We re-estimate 
regressions for Equation (1). The results (untabulated) are consistent with our primary results and 
reinforce the conclusion that the level of investor activism directed to the board of directors 
increases the likelihood of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors. 
Alternative measure of audit committee firing/resignation (Equation 2) 
 In the main analyses, we coded audit committee firing/resignation as equal 1 if at least one 
director on the audit committee gets fired or resigns from the board, and zero otherwise. In this 
section, we use a continuous measure for audit committee director firing/resignation, logAC_EXIT, 
which is the natural log of total number of audit committee directors who resign or get fired from 
the board.19 We re-estimate Equation (2) and report the results in Panel B of Table 8. From Panel 
B of Table 8, the coefficients of RESTANN, VOLDISC, and RESTANN×VOLDISC on logAC_EXIT 
are consistent with those obtained in the main analyses. 
Alternative measure of likelihood of restatement (Equation 3) 
Burns and Kedia (2006) and Healy (1985) provide evidence that restatements affecting 
core earnings are more egregious and thus could be more embarrassing to the auditor. Therefore, 
using the details on financial restatements provided in the Audit Analytics database, we parse 
financial restatements affecting core earnings and noncore earnings to create an alternative 
dependent variable for Equation (3), ISREST_CORE, equals 1 if the annual financial statements 
the auditor is reappointed to audit are subsequently restated in future periods and if the restatement 
affects core earnings, and 0 otherwise. We re-estimate Equation (3) and report the results in Table 
                                                          
19 The result is quantitatively similar if we measure audit committee departure as the number of audit committee 
directors who resign or get fired divided by audit committee size. 
 34 
 
9. The coefficient on VOLDISC is negative and significantly (p < 0.05) associated with 
IS_RESTCORE, suggesting that the disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment 
decreases the likelihood of a restatement affecting core earnings.  
>>> Insert Table 9 here>>> 
6. Conclusion 
In response to investors’ concerns about longer auditor tenure in U.S companies and the 
lack of audit committee transparency, some companies are voluntarily disclosing factors the audit 
committee considers when reappointing the external auditor. Investors and the CAD have 
welcomed these disclosures as a sign of audit committee vigilance in monitoring the external 
auditor. Critics however argue that audit committees may be making these disclosures to ward off 
investor and activist pressure.  
We manually collect data on firms voluntarily disclosing auditor reappointment factors 
from fiscal year 2011 to 2017 to investigate whether the disclosures are indicative of audit 
committee substantive monitoring of the auditor or a mere exercise to create favorable 
impressions. We begin by investigating the determinants of these disclosures. In line with the 
‘favorable impression’ argument, we posit that firms are more likely to disclose auditor 
reappointment factors when perceptions of impaired auditor independence are high and there is 
increasing threat to remove directors, including audit committee members, from the board. On the 
other hand, to the extent that the disclosures are indicative of effective audit committees’ 
monitoring of the auditor, audit committee quality variables examined in the extant literature 




We empirically examine these issues and find results suggesting that both ‘favorable 
impression’ and ‘substantive monitoring’ drive audit committee voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors. Specifically, our evidence suggest that firms are more likely to disclose 
considerations in auditor reappointment when the level of non-audit services is high and when 
investor activists seek to remove or appoint new directors to the board. Our evidence also suggests 
that effective audit committees - those with more financial experts, composed of more directors, 
those with longer-tenured directors, and those with more female directors are more likely to make 
these disclosures. 
To gain insights into which of the two motives (favorable impression versus vigilant 
monitoring) dominates, we examine how the disclosures affect audit committee director careers in 
periods of financial reporting failures. Our evidence suggests that these disclosures decrease the 
likelihood that audit committee directors will quit or be fired from the board in periods of financial 
reporting failures, suggesting that audit committee directors of firms that disclose considerations 
in auditor reappointment are less likely to be blamed for financial reporting failures. Finally, we 
investigate whether and how the disclosures affect the quality of the financial statements the 
auditor is reappointed to audit. Our empirical evidence suggests that voluntary disclosure of 
auditor reappointment factors decreases the likelihood that the financial statements the auditor is 
reappointed to audit will be restated in a future period. Overall, the consequences evidence 
suggests that voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors is indicative of audit committee 
vigilant monitoring of the external auditor. 
Our findings add to the small but burgeoning literature on audit committee voluntary 
disclosures, extend the limited prior studies on audit committee director turnover, and complement 
the literature on audit committee oversight. We offer a new perspective to the audit committee 
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voluntary disclosure literature by suggesting that firms use these disclosures to mitigate the risks 
associated with non-audit services and investor activism directed at the board of directors. Our 
findings highlight that audit committees can mitigate reputational risks and career concerns 
associated with financial reporting failures and that voluntary disclosures signal reduced likelihood 
of future financial reporting failures.  
Notwithstanding potential limitations of our study including the manual nature of data 
collection and inherent limitations of our effort to address endogeneity, our study is also relevant 
to various stakeholders including the SEC, investors and others interested in audit committee 
transparency. We provide evidence that although some firms voluntarily disclose auditor 
reappointment factors to create favorable impressions, overall, these disclosures are more 
indicative of audit committee substantive monitoring of the external auditor.  Our findings should 
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Search criteria and examples of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
Panel A:  SeekInf Search Strings 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considered+whether to retainwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considered+whether to appointwithin 10 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considered+whether to reappointwithin 10 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considered+whether to re-appointwithin 10 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considered+whether to engagewithin 10 
PROXIMITY: audit committee took+whether to retainwithin 30 
PROXIMITY: audit committee took+whether to reappointwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee took+whether to engagewithin 30 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considers+whether to retainwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considers+whether to appointwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considers+whether to engagewithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considers+whether to re-engagewithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee considers+whether to reengagewithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee evaluates+whether to retainwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee evaluates+whether to engagewithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee evaluates+whether to reengagewithin 20 
PROXIMITY: considered by the audit committee+whether to retainwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee annually reviews+whether to engagewithin 20 
PROXIMITY: audit committee has selected+committee consideredwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: determining whether to reappoint+audit committee took intowithin 20 
PROXIMITY: in selecting+audit committee consideredwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: in retaining+audit committee consideredwithin 20 
PROXIMITY: based on this evaluation+audit committeewithin 30 
PROXIMITY: based on these evaluations+audit committeewithin 2 
PROXIMITY: course of these reviews+audit committeewithin 2 
PROXIMITY: in conducting this annual evaluation+audit committeewithin 20 
PROXIMITY: in conducting its latest review of+audit committeewithin 20 
EXACT: determining whether to reappoint 
EXACT: the overall scope and plans of its audits 
EXACT: In doing so, the Audit Committee considers 
EXACT: In doing so, the Audit and Finance Committee considers 
EXACT: In doing so, the Audit Committee considered 
EXACT: audit committee took into consideration+(whether to retain|whether to reappoint|whether to 
reengage|whether to appoint|whether to engage) 
EXACT: prior to retaining+audit committee evaluated 
EXACT: in conducting this annual evaluation 
EXACT: In taking this action+(audit committee considered|audit committee reviews|audit committee took into 
consideration|audit committee assessed) 
EXACT: audit committee considered the accounting firm 
EXACT: audit committee considered a number of factors 
EXACT: audit committee considered carefully 
EXACT: audit committee carefully considered 
EXACT: audit committee took into consideration a number of factors 
EXACT: audit committee assessed 
EXACT: before appointing 
EXACT: audit committee evaluated the performance 
EXACT: based on these considerations 




Appendix A (continued) 
 
Panel B: Examples of audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
Part I: Vertex Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (NASDAQ: VRTX) – 2012 Proxy Statement 
Ernst & Young LLP has been our independent registered public accounting firm since 2005. A new lead 
audit partner is designated at least every five years to provide a fresh perspective and a new lead audit 
partner was designated for the 2010 audit. In determining whether to reappoint our independent registered 
public accounting firm, our audit and finance committee considers the quality of its discussions with and 
the performance of the lead audit partner, the audit team assigned to our account and the overall strength 
and reputation of the firm. 
 
Part II: Walgreens Boot Alliance, Inc. (NASDAQ: WBA) – 2016 Proxy Statement 
At least annually, the Audit Committee reviews the Company’s independent registered public accounting 
firm to decide whether to retain such firm on behalf of the Company. Deloitte has been the Company’s 
independent registered public accounting firm (including its predecessor Walgreens) since May 2002. 
When conducting its latest review of Deloitte, the Audit Committee actively engaged with Deloitte’s 
engagement partners and senior leadership where appropriate and considered, among other factors:  
• the professional qualifications of Deloitte and that of the lead audit partner and other key 
engagement partners relative to the current and ongoing needs of the Company; 
• Deloitte’s historical and recent performance on the Company’s audits, including the extent and 
quality of Deloitte’s communications with the Audit Committee related thereto; 
• the appropriateness of Deloitte’s fees relative to both efficiency and audit quality; 
• Deloitte’s independence policies and processes for maintaining its independence; 
• Deloitte’s tenure as the Company’s independent registered public accounting firm and its related 
depth of understanding of the Company’s businesses, operations and systems and the 
Company’s accounting policies and practices;  
• Deloitte’s capability, expertise and efficiency in handling the breadth and complexity of the 
Company’s operations across the globe; 
• Deloitte’s demonstrated professional integrity and objectivity, which is furthered by the Audit 
Committee-led process to rotate and select the lead audit partner and other key engagement 
partners at least every five years or as otherwise required by applicable law or regulation, and 
which was done most recently in 2016; and 
• the relative benefits, challenges, overall advisability and potential impact of selecting a different 







Panel A: Dependent variables used in the main analyses 
Variable name 
 
Measurement (data source) 
VOLDISC = 1 if the proxy statement discloses audit committee considerations in 
reappointing the incumbent auditor for the coming fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise (SEEKINF). 
AC_EXIT = 1 if at least one audit committee director gets fired or resigns from the 
board within 12 months of a non-reliance restatement announcement, 
and 0 otherwise (AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
IS_REST =  1 if the audited financial statements in the period following the 
disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment are restated in 
future periods, and 0 otherwise (AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
Panel B: Dependent variables used in the additional analyses 
IS_RESTCORE = 1 if the audited financial statements in the period following the 
disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment are subsequently 
restated and if the restatement has negative consequences on previously 
reported core earnings, and 0 otherwise (AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
logAC_EXIT = Log of the number of audit committee director firings or resignations 
from the board within 12 months of non-reliance restatement 
announcement. 
Panel C: Test variables used in the main analyses 
NASRATIO = Ratio of total non-audit fees to total fees (audit and non-audit) paid to the 
auditor during the fiscal year just (AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
ACTIVISM = 1 if the firm received activism communication that seeks to remove or 
nominate directors to the firm's board of directors or a committee of the 
firm’s board of directors during the 12 months preceding the proxy 
filling date, and 0 otherwise (CAPITAL IQ). 
ACEXPRT = Number of audit committee directors who are financial experts divided 
by total number of audit committee directors (BOARDEX). 
ACSIZE = Log of the number of members serving on the audit committee 
(BOARDEX). 
ACTEN = Log of average tenure of all audit committee directors on a firm’s board 
(BOARDEX). 
ACSOSCAP = Audit committee social capital is the average of number of directorships 
held by audit committee directors on the board (BOARDEX). 
ACWOM = The percentage of female directors on a firm’s audit committee 
(BOARDEX). 
RESTANN = 1 if a firm announces an Item 4.02 non-reliance of previously issued 
financial statements in the current fiscal year with negative impact on 
previously issued financial statements, and 0 otherwise (AUDIT 
ANALYTICS). 
VOLDISC = As defined above. 










Appendix B (continued) 
 
Panel D: Test variables used in the additional analyses 
PREVOLDISC = Predicted value of VOLDISC, estimated from the first-stage regression of 
VOLDISC on a set of determinants as denoted by Equation (1). 
NAS_TO_AUD = Ratio of total non-audit fees to total audit fees paid to the auditor during 
the fiscal year (AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
LOGNAS = Log of total non-audit fees paid to the auditor during the fiscal year 
(AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
$NAS = Dollar value of total non-audit fees paid to the auditor during the fiscal 
year (AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
ACTIVISM_SEV = Log of the total number of activism communications that seeks to 
remove or nominate directors to the firm's board of directors or a 
committee of the firm’s board of directors during the 12 months 
preceding the proxy filling date (CAPITAL IQ). 
Panel E: Control variables used in the main analyses 
 
ASSETS = Log of total assets (COMPUSTAT). 
GROWTH  Growth in sales over the previous year (COMPUSTAT). 
LEV = Total debt divided by market value of assets (COMPUSTAT). 
LOSS = 1 if the firm reports net income below zero in the fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise (COMPUSTAT). 
LIT = 1 if the firm operates in litigious industry (four digit SICs 2833-2836; 
3570-3577; 3600-3674; 5200-6951; 7370), and 0 otherwise 
(COMPUSTAT). 
ROA = Return on assets (COMPUSTAT). 
XFIN = Sum of additional cash raised in year t from long-term debt issuance + 
sale of common and preferred stock - purchase of common and preferred 
stock – cash dividends  - long-term debt reduction + current debt changes 
, all scaled by total assets (COMPUSTAT). 
BIG4 = 1 if the firm’s external auditor is a Big 4 auditor, and 0 otherwise 
(AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
ICW = 1 if the firm’s auditor reported material weakness in internal controls 
over financial reporting, and 0 otherwise (AUDIT ANALYTICS). 
BIND = The percentage of directors on the firm's board who are independent 
(BOARDEX). 
INSTOWN = Percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors 
ACAGE = Log of average age of all audit committee directors on a firm’s board 
(BOARDEX). 
RESTR = 1 if the firm has undergone restructuring activities, and 0 otherwise 
(COMPUSTAT). 
CEOTURN = 1 if the CEO is dismissed or resigns from the position during the fiscal 
year, and 0 otherwise (BOARDEX). 
NEWCEO = 1 if the CEO time in the role is 12 months or less, and 0 otherwise 
(BOARDEX). 
FOROPS = 1 if the firm has foreign operations, and 0 otherwise (COMPSUTAT). 
MERGER 
= 1 if the firm reports merger or acquisition, and 0 otherwise 
(COMPSUTAT). 




Sample selection and industry membership 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 Observation 
Non-financial firms with available financial data in the Compustat database from 
fiscal year 2011 to 2017  
23,172 
   Less observations with missing data in Audit Analytics (2,688) 
   Less observations with missing corporate governance data in BoardEx (7,326) 
Primary Sample 13,158 
 





Number of firms that do 
not disclose 
considerations in auditor 
reappointment 
 
Number of firms with 
voluntary disclosure of 






2011 1,913 1,886 27 1.41% 
2012 1,839 1,793 46 2.50% 
2013 2,016 1,955 61 3.03% 
2014 1,988 1,901 87 4.38% 
2015 1,894 1,740 154 8.13% 
2016 1,774 1,600 174 9.81% 
2017 1,734 1512 222 12.80% 
Total 13,158 12,387 771 5.86% 
 
Panel C: Industry membership of firms in the primary sample 
Industry Name Frequency Percentage 
Compustat 
Population 
Consumer non-durables 768 5.84% 4.65% 
Consumer durables 416 3.16% 2.63% 
Manufacturing 1,599 12.15% 8.61% 
Oil, gas, and coal extraction and products 783 5.95% 7.29% 
Chemicals and Allied Products 470 3.57% 2.57% 
Business equipment 2,873 21.83% 18.84% 
Telephone and television transmission 337 2.56% 3.03% 
Utilities 511 3.88% 4.72% 
Wholesale, retail, and some services 1,457 11.07% 8.24% 
Healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs 1,929 14.66% 16.92% 
 11,143 84.69% 77.49% 
All others 2,015 15.31% 22.51% 





Descriptive statistics and univariate tests 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Std 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile 
VOLDISC 13,158 0.059 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NAS fees_unadj ($) 13,158    652,492 2,097,988      18,800    119,091    499,198 
NASRATIO 13,158 0.141 0.136 0.029 0.106 0.217 
ACTIVISM 13,158 0.057 0.231 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ACEXPRT 13,158 0.521 0.286 0.333 0.500 0.750 
ACSIZE 13,158 1.639 0.253 1.386 1.609 1.792 
ACTEN 13,158 2.087 0.485 1.848 2.109 2.405 
ACSOSCAP 13,158 0.982 0.215 0.847 0.916 1.099 
ACWOM 13,158 0.121 0.115 0.000 0.121 0.200 
AC_EXIT 13,158 0.024 0.155 0.000 0.000 0.000 
IS_REST 11,424 0.077 0.265 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RESTANN 13,158 0.063 0.244 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ASSETS 13,158 6.605 2.325 5.033 6.733 8.254 
GROWTH 13,158 0.119 0.662 –0.039 0.045 0.144 
LEV 13,158 0.238 0.381 0.016 0.147 0.329 
LOSS 13,158 0.399 0.490 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LIT 13,158 0.282 0.450 0.000 0.000 1.000 
ROA 13,158 –0.093 0.738 –0.032 0.034 0.074 
XFIN 13,158 0.046 0.311 –0.054 –0.009 0.040 
SP500 13,158 0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIGN 13,158 0.723 0.447 0.000 1.000 1.000 
ICW 13,158 0.065 0.247 0.000 0.000 0.000 
BIND 13,158 0.950 0.088 0.931 1.000 1.000 
INSTOWN 13,158 0.621 0.325 0.479 0.651 0.830 
ACAGE 13,158 4.190 0.084 4.148 4.193 4.241 
RESTR 13,158 0.354 0.478 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CEOTURN 13,158 0.105 0.307 0.000 0.000 0.000 
NEWCEO 13,158 0.118 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.000 
FOROPS 13,158 0.358 0.479 0.000 0.000 1.000 
MERGER 13,158 0.336 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 





TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel B: Univariate test – Variables in the determinants analyses  
(A) (B) (C) 
 VOLDISC = 1 
(n = 771) 
VOLDISC = 0 
(n = 12,387) 
Difference 
Mean (B) vs (A) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Statistic# 
NASRATIO 0.186 0.152 0.139 0.103 9.350*** 
ACTIVISM 0.104 0.000 0.054 0.000 5.811*** 
ACEXPRT 0.609 0.600 0.515 0.429 8.877*** 
ACSIZE 1.705 1.609 1.635 1.609 7.495*** 
ACTEN 2.134 2.156 2.084 2.111 2.748*** 
ACSOSCAP 1.023 0.981 0.979 0.916 5.527*** 
ACWOM 0.187 0.182 0.117 0.120 16.521*** 
ASSETS 8.078 8.174 6.513 6.640 18.370*** 
GROWTH 0.065 0.030 0.123 0.046 2.348*** 
LEV 0.238 0.191 0.238 0.143 0.024 
LOSS 0.358 0.000 0.402 0.000 2.415*** 
LIT 0.271 0.000 0.282 0.000 0.668 
ROA 0.008 0.042 –0.099 0.033 3.900*** 
XFIN –0.008 –0.025 0.049 –0.008 4.964*** 
BIGN 0.879 1.000 0.713 1.000 9.989*** 
SP500 0.405 0.405 0.151 0.358 18.414*** 
ICW 0.014 0.000 0.069 0.000 5.916*** 
BIND 0.927 0.971 0.952 1.000 7.503*** 
INSTOWN 0.701 0.739 0.616 0.643 9.896*** 
 
Panel C: Univariate test – Variables in the audit committee director turnover analyses  
(A) (B) (C) 
 AC_EXIT = 1 
(n = 322) 
AC_EXIT= 0 
(n = 12,836) 
Difference 
Mean (B) vs (A) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Statistic# 
VOLDISC 0.031 0.000 0.059 0.000 2.130** 
RESTANN 0.121 0.000 0.062 0.000 4.137*** 
ACTIVISM 0.152 0.000 0.054 0.000 7.490*** 
ACEXPRT 0.472 0.445 0.522 0.500 3.079*** 
ACSIZE 1.714 1.792 1.637 1.609 5.420*** 
ACTEN 1.753 1.695 2.096 2.116 12.615*** 
ACSOSCAP 1.016 0.968 0.981 0.916 2.924*** 
ACWOM 0.097 0.091 0.122 0.120 3.892*** 
ASSETS 5.859 5.866 6.623 6.759 5.832*** 
GROWTH 0.133 0.014 0.119 0.045 0.369 
LEV 0.275 0.141 0.237 0.147 1.737** 
LIT 0.311 0.000 0.281 0.000 1.777** 
ROA –0.286 –0.008 –0.088 0.034 4.754*** 
ICW 0.124 0.000 0.064 0.000 4.327*** 
INSTOWN 0.635 0.621 0.620 0.654 0.785 
ACAGE 4.175 4.165 4.189 4.193 3.016*** 
RESTR 0.379 0.000 0.354 0.000 0.931 
CEOTURN 0.230 0.000 0.102 0.000 7.367*** 






TABLE 2 (continued) 
Panel D: Univariate test – Variables in the likelihood of financial restatement analyses  
(A) (B) (C) 
 IS_REST = 1 
(n = 874) 
IS_REST= 0 
(n = 10,550) 
Difference 
Mean (B) vs (A) 
Variable Mean Median Mean Median Statistic# 
VOLDISC 0.026 0.000 0.050 0.000 3.260*** 
RESTANN 0.163 0.000 0.056 0.000 12.604*** 
ACEXPRT 0.479 0.400 0.518 0.460 4.035*** 
ACSIZE 1.608 1.609 1.643 1.609 3.992*** 
ASSETS 6.441 6.806 6.515 6.602 0.931 
GROWTH 0.152 0.049 0.117 0.043 1.494* 
LEV 0.320 0.214 0.232 0.139 6.615*** 
LOSS 0.359 0.000 0.406 0.000 2.797** 
ROA –0.124 0.024 –0.101 0.033 0.859 
BIGN 0.718 1.000 0.714 1.000 0.270 
ICW 0.168 0.000 0.059 0.000 12.649*** 
BIND 0.949 1.000 0.958 1.000 3.065*** 
INSTOWN 0.627 0.636 0.607 0.632 1.835* 
RESTR 0.388 0.000 0.342 0.000 2.860** 
FOROPS 0.354 0.000 0.355 0.000 0.113 
MERGER 0.362 0.000 0.325 0.000 2.317** 
AUFEE 13.838 13.960 13.843 13.931 0.096 
This Table presents the descriptive statistics (Panel A) and univariate test of means of variables in the determinants (Panel 
B), audit committee director turnover (Panel C), and financial restatement (Panel D) analyses. *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. # The test statistic represents mean difference t test for 
continuous variables and proportion test z statistic for indicator variables. Median difference tests yield similar inferences. 













 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30)
  (1) VOLDISC 1.00
  (2) NASRATIO 0.08 1.00
  (3) ACTIVISM 0.05 0.00 1.00
  (4) ACEXPRT 0.08 0.04 0.01 1.00
  (5) ACSIZE 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.03 1.00
  (6) ACTEN 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 -0.08 1.00
  (7) ACSOSCAP 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.13 0.19 -0.10 1.00
  (8) ACWOM 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.14 1.00
  (9) AC_FIRED -0.02 -0.01 0.07 -0.03 0.05 -0.11 0.03 -0.03 1.00
  (10) IS_REST -0.03 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 1.00
  (11) RESTANN 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.12 1.00
  (12) ASSETS 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.20 0.36 0.11 0.34 0.30 -0.05 -0.01 0.03 1.00
  (13) GROWTH -0.02 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.08 0.01 -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.07 1.00
  (14) LEV 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.06 -0.04 1.00
  (15) LOSS -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 -0.02 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.00 1.00
  (16) LIT -0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.16 0.07 -0.13 0.03 1.00
  (17) ROA 0.03 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.17 0.08 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.35 -0.05 -0.15 -0.03 -0.09 1.00
  (18) XFIN -0.04 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 -0.16 -0.13 -0.02 -0.07 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.34 0.12 0.08 0.04 0.12 -0.75 1.00
  (19) SP500 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.13 0.21 0.07 0.25 0.26 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.57 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 0.10 -0.12 1.00
  (20) BIGN 0.09 0.15 -0.01 0.15 0.26 0.06 0.31 0.23 -0.04 0.00 0.05 0.62 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.20 -0.20 0.27 1.00
  (21) ICWEAK -0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.04 0.04 0.12 0.16 -0.21 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.03 -0.22 0.17 -0.10 -0.16 1.00
  (22) BIND -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.18 -0.12 0.06 -0.06 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 1.00
  (23) INSTOWN 0.06 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.35 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.07 -0.08 0.16 0.32 -0.06 -0.07 1.00
  (24) ACAGE -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.30 0.05 -0.09 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.01 0.03 -0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00
  (25) RESTR 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.18 -0.01 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.28 -0.09 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.08 -0.13 0.13 0.24 -0.04 -0.02 0.17 -0.02 1.00
  (26) CEOTURN 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.01 0.06 -0.07 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.06 0.10 1.00
  (27) NEWCEO -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.06 -0.07 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.04 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.10 0.84 1.00
  (28) FOROPS 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.13 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.15 -0.03 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 0.07 -0.08 0.05 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.21 0.01 0.01 1.00
  (29) MERGER 0.04 0.13 -0.01 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.10 -0.05 0.08 0.18 -0.02 -0.01 0.16 0.01 0.22 -0.02 -0.02 0.11 1.00
  (30) AUFEE 0.16 0.11 0.04 0.21 0.36 0.07 0.35 0.30 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.88 -0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.27 -0.27 0.51 0.64 -0.15 -0.08 0.35 0.05 0.38 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.27 1.00





Audit committee disclosure of auditor reappointment factors, auditor independence, investor 
activism, and audit committee quality. 
Dependent variable: VOLDISC 
Variable Pred. Sign Coeff. z-value 
Intercept ? –6.306*** –10.49 
NASRATIO (H1) + 1.651*** 6.10 
ACTIVISM (H2) + 0.515*** 3.69 
ACEXPRT (H3) + 0.518*** 3.89 
ACSIZE (H3) + 0.441*** 2.52 
ACTEN (H3) + 0.160** 1.91 
ACSOSCAP (H3) + 0.109 0.55 
ACWOM (H3) + 1.915*** 5.92 
ASSETS + 0.124*** 3.93 
GROWTH ? –0.080 –0.72 
LEV ? 0.023 0.24 
LOSS ? –0.089 –1.10 
LIT + 0.197** 1.69 
ROA ? –0.099 –0.98 
XFIN - –0.372* –1.46 
SP500 + 0.401*** 3.60 
BIGN + 0.004 0.03 
ICW ? –1.192*** –3.73 
BIND + –0.840** –1.85 
INSTOWN + 0.116* 1.46 
Year FE                       Included 
Industry FE                       Included 
Observations                          13,158 
Wald Chi2                          726.38*** 
Pseudo R2                            0.151 
This table presents logistic regression results of the effect of perceived impaired audit quality 
(NASRATIO), investor activism directed at board of directors (ACTIVISM), and audit committee 
quality (ACEXPRT, ACSIZE, ACTEN, ACSOSCAP, ACWOM) on the likelihood of disclosing auditor 
reappointment factors  *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances. Significance is based on p-values that are 







Audit committee turnover, non-reliance restatements, and the disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors. 
  (A) (B) 
Dependent variables:  AC_EXIT AC_EXIT 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Intercept ? –7.679 –2.37** –7.620** –2.36 
RESTANN + 0.619*** 3.46 0.616*** 3.45 
VOLDISC ?   –0.571* –1.67 
RESTANN×VOLDISC (H4) ?   –3.192*** –3.19 
ACTIVISM + 0.775*** 4.59 0.786*** 4.65 
ACEXPRT - –0.427** –1.93 –0.413** –1.87 
ACSIZE + 1.213*** 5.36 1.223*** 5.38 
ACTEN ? –0.938*** –8.68 –0.931*** –8.61 
ACSOSCAP + 0.847*** 2.69 0.847*** 2.69 
ACWOM - –1.876*** –3.11 –1.812*** –3.00 
ASSETS ? –0.161*** –4.40 –0.158*** –4.29 
GROWTH - –0.026 –0.38 –0.027 –0.39 
LEV ? 0.090 0.81 0.088 0.79 
LIT + 0.163 0.99 0.163 0.99 
ROA - –0.082** –1.83 –0.084** –1.86 
ICW + 0.169 0.88 0.157 0.81 
INSTOWN + 0.389*** 4.24 0.383*** 4.28 
ACAGE + 0.785 1.01 0.759 0.98 
RESTR + 0.074 0.55 0.073 0.54 
CEOTURN + 0.255 0.95 0.251 0.94 
NEWCEO + 0.433** 1.66 0.435** 1.67 
Year FE  Included Included 
Industry FE  Included Included 
Observations  13,158 13,158 
Wald Chi2        359.54***       368.48*** 
Pseudo R2  0.105 0.106 
This table presents logistic regression results of the effect of voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors on the likelihood of audit committee director firing/ resignation following the 
announcement of non-reliance of previously issued financial statement. *, **, *** denote significance 
at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of 
variances. Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with a predicted sign, and 







Non-reliance restatements and the disclosure of auditor reappointment factors. 
Dependent variable:  IS_REST 
Variable Pred. Sign Coeff. z-value 
Intercept ? –0.717 –0.97 
VOLDISC (H5) ? –0.411** –1.99 
RESTANN + 0.928*** 8.28 
ACEXPRT - –0.534*** –3.93 
ACSIZE - –0.568*** –3.31 
ASSETS ? 0.010 0.27 
GROWTH ? 0.061 1.35 
LEV + 0.250*** 3.70 
LOSS ? –0.208*** –2.81 
ROA ? 0.083* 1.71 
BIGN ? 0.055 0.52 
ICW + 1.027*** 8.62 
BIND - –1.142*** –2.79 
INSTOWN ? 0.141* 1.74 
RESTR + 0.216*** 2.58 
FOROPS + –0.004 –0.05 
MERGER + 0.193*** 2.44 
AUFEE ? 0.033 0.56 
Year FE  Included 
Industry FE  Included 
Observations  11,424 
Wald Chi2        592.06*** 
Pseudo R2  0.085 
Number of restatements       874 
This table reports regression results of the effect of voluntary disclosure of considerations in 
auditor reappointment on the likelihood that the financial statements the auditor is reappointed 
to audit will be restated in future periods.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 
0.01 levels, respectively, based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances. 
Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with a predicted sign, and 





Panel A: Mean comparison of voluntary disclosure firms and non-disclosure firms matched on 
propensity scores.  
 (A) (B) (C) 
 VOLDISC = 1 
(n = 771) 
VOLDISC = 0 
(n = 771) 
Difference 
(A) vs (B) 
 Mean Median Mean Median Statistic# 
NASRATIO 0.186 0.152 0.184 0.155 0.289 
ACTIVISM 0.104 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.971 
ACEXPRT 0.609 0.600 0.609 0.600 0.015 
ACSIZE 1.705 1.609 1.716 1.609 0.904 
ACTEN 2.134 2.156 2.117 2.152 0.826 
ACSOSCAP 1.023 0.981 1.030 0.981 1.214 
ACWOM 0.187 0.182 0.183 0.179 0.205 
ASSETS 8.078 8.174 7.983 8.135 0.898 
GROWTH 0.065 0.030 0.052 0.044 0.682 
LEV 0.238 0.191 0.225 0.170 1.094 
LOSS 0.358 0.000 0.336 0.000 0.910 
LIT 0.271 0.000 0.309 0.000 1.427 
ROA 0.008 0.042 -0.019 0.045 1.152 
XFIN -0.008 -0.025 -0.013 -0.024 0.675 
SP500 0.405 0.405 0.439 0.208 0.887 
BIGN 0.879 1.000 0.879 1.000 0.000 
ICW 0.014 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.212 
BIND 0.927 0.971 0.933 0.980 1.056 
INSTOWN 0.701 0.739 0.694 0.741 0.560 
This Panel presents the mean and median of variables matched on propensity scores. We use a one-to-one 
firm matching with a caliper of 0.1 to derive the PSM sample. # The test statistic represents mean 
difference t test for continuous variables and proportion test z statistic for indicator variables. Median 
difference tests yield the same results. As shown in the table, the t-values indicate there are no significant 
differences in the mean of firms that disclose considerations in auditor reappointment and the matched 
peers. See Appendix B for variable definitions.  
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TABLE 7 (continued) 
Panel B: Regression of audit committee member firing following non-reliance restatement, conditional 
on disclosure of auditor reappointment factors 
  (A) (B) 
Dependent variables:  AC_EXIT AC_EXIT 
Variable Pred. 
Sign Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Intercept  –9.300 –0.76 –6.667 –0.58 
RESTANN + 1.234*** 2.89 1.232*** 2.88 
VOLDISC ?   –0.874** –2.06 
RESTANN × VOLDISC ?   –4.555*** –3.37 
ACTIVISM + 0.756** 1.79 0.831** 1.99 
ACEXPRT - –1.571*** –2.39 –1.496*** –2.42 
ACSIZE + –0.091 –0.17 –0.114 –0.19 
ACTEN ? –1.527*** –2.65 –1.361*** –2.41 
ACSOSCAP + –1.309 –1.23 –1.145 –1.07 
ACWOM - –1.765* –1.29 –1.499 –1.08 
ASSETS ? –0.164* –1.29 –0.155 –1.17 
GROWTH - –0.752* –1.38 –0.805* –1.46 
LEV ? –0.060 –0.10 –0.002 0.00 
LIT + 0.256 0.53 0.193 0.40 
ROA - 0.008 0.05 0.078 0.48 
ICW + 0.887 1.13 1.229** 1.79 
INSTOWN + 0.614 0.62 0.174 0.19 
ACAGE + 2.476 0.83 1.794 0.64 
RESTR + 0.590 1.29 0.497 1.08 
CEOTURN + 0.822** 1.92 0.878** 1.85 
NEWCEO + 0.346 0.86 0.375 0.85 
Year FE  Included Included 
Industry FE  Included Included 
Observations  1,542 1,542 
Wald Chi2  139.94*** 177.31*** 
Pseudo R2  0.185 0.215 
This table presents logistic regression results of effect of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors on the likelihood of audit committee member firing/ resignation following the announcement 
of non-reliance of previously issued financial statement. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances. Significance is based 
on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with a predicted sign, and two-tailed otherwise. See Appendix B 






TABLE 7 (continued) 
Panel C: Regression of likelihood of non-reliance restatement on disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors 
Dependent variable:  IS_REST 
Variable Pred. Sign Coeff. z-value 
Intercept ? –11.945*** –2.95 
VOLDISC ? –0.653** –2.09 
RESTANN + 1.774*** 4.81 
ACEXPRT - –0.878* –1.74 
ACSIZE - 0.158 0.25 
ASSETS ? –0.766*** –3.58 
GROWTH ? –0.383 –0.78 
LEV + 1.304*** 3.74 
LOSS ? –0.119 –0.42 
ROA ? 1.171 1.00 
BIGN ? 0.249 0.42 
ICW + 1.676*** 3.07 
BIND - –1.840 –1.21 
INSTOWN ? 1.269** 2.04 
RESTR + 0.352 0.97 
FOROPS + –0.077 –0.23 
MERGER + 0.447* 1.45 
AUFEE ? 0.969*** 2.81 
Year FE  Included 
Industry FE  Included 
Observations  1,098 
Wald Chi2  81.11*** 
Pseudo R2  0.183 
This table reports regression results of effect of voluntary disclosure of considerations in auditor reappointment 
on the likelihood that the financial statements the auditor is reappointed to audit will be restated in future periods 
for the PSM sample.  *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on the 
Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances. Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables 






  (A) (B) 
Dependent variables:  AC_EXIT IS_REST 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Intercept  –7.396** –2.32 –0.781 –1.04 
PREVOLDISC ?/? –1.556 –0.84 –4.214*** –2.62 
RESTANN × PREVOLDISC ? 5.492*** 2.73   
RESTANN +/+ 0.277 1.23 0.940*** 8.42 
ACTIVISM + 0.766*** 4.31   
ACEXPRT -/- –0.412** –1.82 –0.449*** –3.27 
ACSIZE +/- 1.206*** 5.32 –0.540*** –3.10 
ACTEN ? –0.928*** –8.60   
ACSOSCAP + 0.839*** 2.68   
ACWOM - –1.750*** –2.57   
ASSETS ?/? –0.151*** –3.57 0.038 0.95 
GROWTH -/? –0.028 –0.40 0.053 1.18 
LEV ?/+ 0.087 0.78 0.302*** 4.41 
LOSS ?   –0.216*** –2.94 
LIT + 0.172 1.04   
ROA -/? –0.081** –1.77 0.050 1.13 
BIGN -   0.082 0.80 
ICW +/+ 0.198 1.01 1.193*** 10.45 
BIND -   –1.356*** –3.32 
INSTOWN +/? 0.386*** 4.24 0.120 1.57 
ACAGE + 0.710 0.93   
RESTR +/+ 0.081 0.59 0.266*** 3.24 
CEOTURN + 0.249 0.92   
NEWCEO + 0.441** 1.68   
FOROPS +   –0.028 –0.36 
MERGER +   0.186*** 2.37 
AUFEE ?   0.050 0.80 
Year FE  Included Included 
Industry FE  Included Included 
Observations  13,158 11,424 
Wald Chi2  367.32*** 576.21*** 
Pseudo R2  0.106 0.084 
This table presents the second-stage regression results of effect of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors on: the likelihood of audit committee member firing/ resignation (Column A), and the likelihood that the 
financial statements the auditor is reappointed to audit will be restated in future periods (Column B). *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate 
of variances. Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with a predicted sign, and two-






Alternative variable measurements 
Panel A: Alternative measure of likelihood of restatement 
Dependent variable:  IS_RESTCORE 
Variable 
Pred. 
Sign Coeff. z-value 
Intercept ? –1.421 –1.02 
VOLDISC ? –1.163** –2.24 
RESTANN + 0.770*** 4.43 
ACEXPRT - –1.301*** –5.18 
ACSIZE - –1.014*** –3.33 
ASSETS ? –0.033 –0.49 
GROWTH ? –0.059 –0.56 
LEV + 0.142* 1.45 
LOSS ? –0.045 –0.38 
ROA ? 0.230** 2.43 
BIGN ? 0.017 0.11 
ICW + 1.378*** 8.46 
BIND - –1.350** –2.25 
INSTOWN ? 0.200** 2.50 
RESTR + 0.421*** 3.16 
FOROPS + –0.194* –1.52 
MERGER + 0.109 0.83 
AUFEE - 0.095 0.77 
Year FE  Included 
Industry FE  Included 
Observations  11,424 
Wald Chi2  341.89*** 
Pseudo R2  0.089 
Number of restatements  313 
This panel reports regression results of the effect of voluntary disclosure of auditor 
reappointment factors on the likelihood of a restatement affecting core earnings.  *, **, *** 
denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on the Huber-White 
sandwich estimate of variances. Significance is based on p-values that are one-tailed for 






TABLE 9 (continued) 
Panel B: Alternative measure of audit committee member firing 
  (A) (B) 
Dependent variables:  logAC_EXIT logAC_EXIT 
Variable Pred. Sign Coeff. z-value Coeff. z-value 
Intercept ? –0.124 –1.57 –0.102 –1.33 
RESTANN + 0.018*** 2.66 0.006 1.10 
VOLDISC ?   –0.010*** –2.89 
RESTANN × VOLDISC ?   0.159*** 3.07 
ACTIVISM + 0.028*** 3.64 0.016** 2.24 
ACEXPRT - –0.014*** –3.02 –0.014*** –3.00 
ACSIZE + 0.028*** 4.68 0.027*** 4.54 
ACTEN ? –0.026*** –7.13 –0.025*** –7.01 
ACSOSCAP + 0.022** 2.29 0.022** 2.29 
ACWOM - –0.040*** –3.61 –0.038*** –3.43 
ASSETS ? –0.004*** –4.41 –0.004*** –4.26 
GROWTH - –0.002 –0.91 –0.002 –0.84 
LEV ? 0.002 0.58 0.002 0.58 
LIT + 0.003 0.92 0.003 0.90 
ROA - –0.002 –1.06 –0.002 –1.09 
ICW + 0.004 0.57 0.003 0.46 
INSTOWN + 0.015** 2.03 0.015** 2.03 
ACAGE + 0.034** 1.77 0.029* 1.55 
RESTR + 0.000 –0.13 0.000 0.12 
CEOTURN + 0.009 1.00 0.008 0.90 
NEWCEO + 0.013* 1.53 0.013* 1.55 
Year FE  Included Included 
Industry FE  Included Included 
Observations  13,158 13,158 
F-value            4.27***           4.13*** 
Adjusted R2  0.036 0.042 
This panel presents OLS regression results of the effect of voluntary disclosure of auditor reappointment 
factors on the likelihood of audit committee member firing/ resignation following the announcement of 
non-reliance of previously issued financial statements. *, **, *** denote significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively, based on the Huber-White sandwich estimate of variances. Significance 
is based on p-values that are one-tailed for variables with a predicted sign, and two-tailed otherwise. 
See Appendix B for variable definitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
